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The arms broker who delivers arms to known human rights
violators in conflict zones despite United Nations embargos is a
central figure in civil and international armed conflicts. His cargo is
instrumental to the commission of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, the conscription of child soldiers, rapes, and the
destruction of lives and livelihoods. It has been estimated that,
between 1991 and 2002, 4 million people were killed with small arms
in internal conflicts.' It has also been shown that over 50 percent of
the war casualties in the 1990s were civilians.2
While the international community is well aware of the harms
caused by illegal arms traffic, arms brokers continue to enjoy broad
impunity under existing international and domestic law. That
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impunity stems from three factors: from the nature of the
international arms trade, which is uniquely difficult to regulate; from
the murky legal status of United Nations embargos, which are
difficult to enforce; and from inadequate political will to implement
measures to regulate, deter and punish arms brokers, as evidenced by
inadequate legislation of their activities.
Human rights advocates have called for the prosecution of arms
brokers before international criminal tribunals and the International
Criminal Court (ICC). In examining this possibility, I hope to show
that these calls are justified in substance, but may be incompatible
with the current realities of international criminal law and its
institutions. Throughout the paper I will note issues which make it
unlikely that such prosecutions will occur in the near future, despite
the fact that they are theoretically, and legally, possible. In doing so I
will highlight an existing tension between the realities of international
criminal law and the aspirations of international criminal law. An
examination of the realities of international criminal law shows that,
in seeking to combat the impunity of arms brokers, a better solution
lies in increased domestic and international regulation of their
activities. However, international criminal law can play a valuable
role by underlining the gravity of the acts committed by arms brokers,
and by placing the acts in proper context, alongside the worst crimes
that are prosecuted in high profile international courts and tribunals.
I will begin in Part II with a brief discussion of the activities of
arms brokers, examining why they are uniquely difficult to both
regulate and prosecute. I will illustrate their operations by describing
one particular case of illegal arms traffic to Rwanda which has been
thoroughly investigated by the United Nations, an example I will
return to throughout the paper as a means of giving context to the
ideas discussed.
Part III explores the legal theories and the institutions of
international criminal law which may be used to directly hold a black
market arms broker accountable. The International Criminal Court
has the ability to prosecute black market arms brokers for the core
crimes listed in the Rome Statute under a theory of aiding and
abetting or complicity in the commission of genocide, war crimes, or
crimes against humanity. As the ICC has just issued its first
indictments and has not yet held trials or issued judgments, I will look
Keppler, Note, Preventing Human Rights Abuses by Regulating Arms Brokering: the
US Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 381 (2001).
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to the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) for examples of the types of
cases which may be brought.
Part IV illustrates how international criminal law can indirectly
hold black market arms brokers accountable through triggering
domestic prosecution and through the development of treaty law. I
will describe how the ICC is designed to encourage domestic
prosecution. I will examine how a combination of treaties, including
the Rome Statute of the ICC, and a planned international instrument
to regulate arms brokering, may work to put new pressure on states
to prosecute arms brokers in domestic jurisdictions.
I will conclude by examining the general political climate in
which these developments are taking place, and discuss how political
will may have an impact on efforts to stop illegal arms brokering
activity.
II. Background on Illegal Arms Brokering
a. What it Means to be a Black Market Arms Broker
Illegal arms dealing is a dangerous and profitable business, the
methods of which are not always visible, but the effects of which are
horribly evident in conflict zones around the world. A
groundbreaking 1996 United Nations investigation into arms
smuggling into Rwanda gave this general description of the
operations of arms brokers in Africa:
Reliable and highly reliable sources in Belgium, Kenya, Rwanda,
South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania and the United
Kingdom painted a coherent picture of huge, loose, overlapping
webs of more or less illicit arms deals, arms flights and arms
deliveries spanning the continent from South Africa as far as
Europe, particularly Eastern Europe. Often the participants are
businessmen, sometimes with a military or security background,
who may or may not also be engaged in entirely legitimate
operations having no connection with the arms trade. Many are
motivated more by profit than by political or strategic
considerations. The aircraft used range from large cargo carriers to
small private planes capable of landing on bush airstrips. Those
engaged in such activities make free use of fake end-user
certificates, exploit loopholes in the law, evade customs and other
airport controls by making clandestine night take-offs and landings,
file false flight plans and conceal their movements by using
2006]
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fabricated zone permits, evading radar tracking and observing radio
silence in flight. Amid this extensive traffic, which also deals in
contraband drugs, firearms, diamonds and gold, the sale and supply
of arms and mat6riel to the former Rwandan government forces is
.4but one small piece of the mosaic.
In this discussion I will focus on "small arms and light weapons"
(here, "arms" or "small arms"). This category includes the same
types of weapons legally manufactured and purchased for use by
national militaries and police forces, and in some countries, legally
owned by civilians. Small arms are "lightweight, easy to conceal,
can be immediately used by the purchaser, and can be recycled
around the world's conflicts."5 Almost all small arms on the black
market have a legitimate origin, having been manufactured under
government control, taken from military stockpiles, or bought from
6licensed gun dealers.
Most international movement of small arms is indeed, by strict
definitions, legal, as every state not under international embargo has
the right to purchase arms.7  Some national and international
instruments do exist to regulate trade in small arms, and these will be
discussed in greater detail in Part IV below. It suffices to note at this
point that many of these instruments are either not legally binding, or
contain loopholes that are easily exploited by experienced arms
dealers.
In general, the legal trade in small arms is licensed by the
government of the exporting state.8 While requirements vary from
state to state, at a minimum most states require documentation,
commonly in the form of end-user certificates specifying the
destination of the arms. These end-user certificates can be, and often
are, forged or falsified. Regulatory controls are further undermined
by corruption on multiple levels - routing through countries with lax
or permissive customs and trade rules, and bribes to manufacturers,
dealers, transporters and state officials willing to participate in an
illegal or off-the-books transaction.
4. International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), Third report of the
International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), 90-91, U.N. Doc. S/1997/1010 (Dec.
24, 1997).
5. Nicholas Marsh, Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal Trade in
Small Arms, THE BROWN J. OF WORLD AFF., Spring 2002, at 223.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 217.
8. Id. at 218.
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The illegal arms trade is commonly divided into two categories,
termed gray and black markets. Gray market transfers are conducted
by or with the complicity of national governments. 9  Heavy
government involvement in the illegal arms trade took place during
and after the Cold War, when superpowers and allies stockpiled
weapons and then disarmed rapidly in the 1990s, flooding the market
with cheap arms." The stockpiles of weapons in the former Soviet
Union, for example, are a major source for illegal arms dealers, and
the former Soviet Union has also produced some of the world's most
notorious traffickers." The gray market in illegal arms trade also
includes governments' covert arming of rebel or insurgent groups,
and the recruitment and training of private traffickers to deliver the
weapons outside of regular channels. 12 Recent reports have shown
that the gray market in illegal arms continues to thrive in the context
of increased militarization that is the ongoing "war on terror."'3
This paper will focus on black market transfers, which are
defined as those which operate beyond governments' knowledge or
control.14  Black market transfers are conducted by private
individuals, criminal organizations, or non-state actors such as rebel
groups. 5 However, it is important to note that gray market and black
market transfers often overlap. Government dealings in the gray
market provide sources for the black market, further blur the
distinction between legal and illegal dealing, and may provide
employment for arms brokers who trade in the black market as well. 6
This overlap of semi-legitimate and illegal deals becomes especially
important for understanding the problems of political will behind the
impunity of arms brokers.
The discussion of international criminal law in this paper will
focus on individual criminal responsibility of arms brokers. An arms
broker has been defined as "any private individual or company that
9. LORETTA BONDI & ELISE KEPPLER, THE FUND FOR PEACE, CASTING THE
NET? THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. LAW ON ARMS BROKERING 17 (2001).
10. Id. at 14-15.
11. See C.J. Chivers, Ill-Secured Soviet Arms Depots Tempting Rebels and
Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2005, at Al. See also Peter Landesman, Arms and the
Man, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 17, 2003, at 28.
12. BONDI AND KEPPLER, supra note 9, at 14-15.
13. See Douglas Farah and Kathi Austin, Air America, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan.
23, 2006.
14. Marsh, supra note 5, at 221.
15. Id. at 223.
16. Id. at 226.
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acts as an intermediary between a supplier and a recipient of weapons
to facilitate an arms transaction in return for a fee."17 Arms brokers
may never take possession of the arms, but provide "an essential
facilitating role" in supplying illegal groups with weapons.18 This
means that the broker may play any number of roles in the deal, but
for our purposes and for the purposes of prosecution, they must be
the person who knowingly provides the means to commit certain
crimes." The extent of knowledge and participation required for
prosecution under international criminal law will be discussed further
in Part III below.
b. The Weakness and Uses of United Nations Embargos
Regulation of the arms trade is largely a matter of domestic
legislation and licensing, and varies from country to country.
International organizations, however, such as the United Nations
Security Council, the European Union, and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, can and do issue embargos
intended to prevent arms trade to certain locations or groups for
certain periods of time.' These embargos are generally issued in
response to an ongoing state of conflict or humanitarian crisis.2 A
typical embargo calls upon all states to prevent the sale or supply of
arms and related mat6riel by their nationals or from their territories
or using their flag vessels or aircraft to that state or group.22 The
17. BONDI AND KEPPLER, supra note 9, at 8.
18. Marsh, supra note 5, at 225.
19. Seven main activities have been identified which are performed by arms
brokers with the intent of facilitating arms deals. They include: prospecting, offering
technical advice, sourcing, mediating negotiations, arranging financing schemes,
obtaining necessary documentation, and organizing transport of the ordered
weapons. See HOLGER ANDERS AND SILVIA CATrANEO, GROUPE DE RECHERCHE ET
D'INFORMATION SUR LA PAIX ET LA SECURITE (GRIP), REGULATING ARMS
BROKERING: TAKING STOCK AND MOVING FORWARD THE UNITED NATIONS PROCESS
9 (2005), available at <www.iansa.org/issues/documents/brokering-report-
grip09O5.pdf>.
20. Marsh, supra note 5, at 218.
21. For example, when placing an arms embargo on Rwanda in 1994, the United
Nations Security Council expressed "deep concern" over the mounting casualties, the
refugee situation in Rwanda and accumulating violations of international
humanitarian law. S.C. Res. 918, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (1994).
22. See, e.g., S/RES/918, supra note 21, calling upon all states to "prevent the sale
or supply to Rwanda by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag
vessels or aircraft of arms and related mat6riel of all types, including weapons and
ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and
spare parts." As of early 2005, United Nations Security Council embargos were in
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imposition of an embargo, however, does not itself criminalize arms
traffic in United Nations member states, until additional national
legislation is passed to enact it into domestic law. This domestic
legislation is not always passed, however, or not passed in a timely
manner, making embargos difficult to enforce, and in the absence of
other means of sanction, making it difficult to discern when arms
traffic is illegal.
Embargos are relevant to this discussion for two reasons. The
first is that a United Nations Security Council embargo puts arms
brokers on notice of a humanitarian or human rights crisis, as it is
reasonable to expect that arms brokers will become aware of the
embargo in the regular conduct of legal trade. Criminal prosecution
of arms brokers for serious violations of international humanitarian
law requires proof that the broker knew or should have known that
certain crimes had been or were likely to be committed as a result of
their actions. Knowledge of an embargo which explicitly warns of a
humanitarian crisis may be used as partial evidence of mens rea. The
mens rea necessary for prosecution for genocide, war crimes, and
crime against humanity will be discussed in detail below in Part III.
The second reason has to do with the relationship between the
illegal international arms trade and domestic legislation. Criminal
prosecution has traditionally been the province of individual states,
and the prosecution of individuals by international bodies has been
restricted to ad-hoc institutions which dealt with crimes of a certain
magnitude and situations where domestic prosecutions were judged
inadequate or impossible. But a major problem with domestic
prosecution of arms brokers is inadequate domestic implementation
of arms embargos into domestic law, reflecting, among other things,
lack of domestic political will to criminalize breaking embargos.
If the ineffectiveness of embargos is largely due to inadequate
domestic implementation, the presence of a permanent international
criminal court may provide a means of reinforcing state obligations to
criminalize embargo breaking. As the ICC investigates conflicts, it
will likely uncover arms deals which provided the means for crimes
within its jurisdiction. While the principle of non-retroactivity will
place on Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Al-Qaida and the Taliban, Iraq,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire and Sudan. See The Secretary-
General, Small arms Report of the Secretary General, 52, U.N. Doc. S/2005/69, (Feb.
7, 2005). See also Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, Use of
Sanctions Under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, at
<www.un.org/News/ossg/sanction.htm> (visited Nov. 17, 2005).
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prevent domestic prosecution for crimes if no legislation had
implemented the embargo, the overall cumulative effect may be to
focus more international attention on the weaknesses of embargos.
This in turn may underline the need for international regulation of
the arms trade, and the need to have in place domestic legislation to
prosecute future violations.
c. Black Market Arms in Rwanda
As international attention is more readily drawn to the direct
perpetrators of crimes than to those who supply the means, it is
helpful to examine an actual arms deal which resulted in the supply of
arms to the Rwandan military while under embargo. This deal
illustrates both the type of evidence that might be gathered by
international investigators, as well as a common scenario in which an
arms broker is a known accomplice to certain crimes but is not
prosecuted.
The ICTR is prosecuting Colonel Theoneste Bagasora, a high-
ranking officer of the Rwandan government forces.23 His indictment
states, "during and before the events referred to in this indictment
[Bagasora and others] distributed weapons to the militiamen and
certain carefully selected members of the civilian population with the
intent to exterminate the Tutsi population and its "accomplices."24
Bagasora is charged with individual responsibility for Conspiracy to
Commit Genocide, Genocide, Complicity in Genocide, multiple
counts of Crimes against Humanity, and multiple counts of Serious
Violations of Article Three Common to the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol 11.25 His indictment significantly includes this
procurement and distribution of weapons.26
In contrast to Bagasora, South African arms dealer Willem
Ehlers has not been indicted by the ICTR, despite having been
involved in one of the first exhaustively documented examples of
illegal arms traffic into Rwanda. The deal was uncovered by Human
Rights Watch, and subsequently investigated by a specially convened
United Nations investigation (UNICOI). The investigation found
that in June of 1994, while there was a United Nations Security
23. The Prosecutor v. Theoneste Bagasora, Case No. ICTR 96-7-I, Amended
Indictment (Aug, 12, 1999).





Council embargo in place on Rwanda, Bagasora met and bought
shipments of arms from Ehlers.2' The transactions took place in
Seychelles, and the government was able to corroborate that Ehlers
and Bagasora had purchased two shipments of arms which had been
imported, via Zaire, to Rwanda. In its second report, UNICOI found
the following:
On the basis of the evidence it has discovered in Zaire and
Seychelles, the Commission is satisfied that the Government of
Seychelles, acting on the basis of an end-user certificate apparently
issued by the Government of Zaire, authorized a sale of weapons in
its possession in mid-June 1994. The arms, which included AK-47
rifles, 82-mm and 60-mm mortar shells and 37-mm and 14.5-mm
ammunition, were transported from Seychelles to Goma on 17 and
19 June 1994 by an Air Zaire DC-8 cargo aircraft, registration
28number 9QCLV, in two consignments of about 40 tons each.
The Government of Zaire did not allow UNICOI to investigate
for first-hand evidence of a handover of the shipment from Zaire to
Rwandan government forces. However, based on the participation of
Bagasora, the fact that Bagasora personally accompanied the arms to
Goma, and personal testimony to the Commission, UNICOI
concluded that the arms were destined for and delivered to the
Rwandan government forces.29 They found it "highly probable that a
violation of the United Nations embargo took place involving the
supply of more than 80 tons of rifles, grenades and ammunition in two
27. See Kathi L. Austin, Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the
Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide, HUM. RTS. WATCH, May 1995; Austin, supra
note 1, at 212. See also International Commission of Inquiry, Interim Report of the
International Commission of Inquiry to Investigate Reports of the Sale or Supply of
Arms to Former Rwandan Government Forces in Violation of the Security Council
Arms Embargo and Allegations that those Forces are Receiving Training to
Destabilize Rwanda, U.N Doe. S/1996/67 (Jan. 29, 1996); International Commission
of Inquiry, Final report of the International Commission of Inquiry for the
Investigation of Arms Flows to Former Rwandan Government Forces in the Great
Lakes Region, U.N. Doe. S/1996/195 (Mar. 13, 1996); International Commission of
Inquiry, Third report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), U.N.
Doc. Sf199711010 (Dec. 24, 1997); International Commission of Inquiry, Addendum
to the 3rd report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), U.N. Doe.
S/1998163 (Jan. 26, 1998); International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), Interim
report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), U.N. Doe. S/1998/777
(Aug. 19, 1998); International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), Final report of the
International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), U.N. Doe. Sf1998/1096 (Nov. 18,
1998).
28. S/1996/195 supra note 27 at 15.
29. Id.
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consignments flown to Goma airport on 17 and 19 June 1994 and
subsequently transferred to the Rwandan government forces then in
Gisenyi, Rwanda." 3°
UNICOI investigated Ehlers further to determine whether he
had "aided and abetted the sale or supply of arms to the Rwandan
government forces in violation of the embargo., 3' Ehlers stated that
he "had been assured that the arms were destined for Zaire and had
been 'shocked' to read subsequently that the recipients were in fact
the former Rwandan government forces. 32 He did not deny the
transaction with Bagasora, who had been presented to him as a
"technical expert." 33 UNICOI also was able to obtain from the
government of Seychelles substantial documentation of this
transaction, including itemized receipts signed by Bagasora, and the
fake end-user certificate.
Following Bagasora's indictment, human rights advocates called
on the ICTR to prosecute Ehlers for his participation in the Rwandan
atrocities, arguing that the indictment of an arms broker in the ICTR
would serve the ends of both justice and deterrence. 34 Advocates saw
a role for international criminal law, in holding Ehlers accountable, to
address not only his crimes but also to serve as a warning to illegal
arms brokers. A prosecuted case before the ICTR would put arms
brokers on notice, and by providing case law and precedent, would
empower the ICC to try arms brokers for their individual
responsibility for egregious violations of international law.35
Ehlers was never indicted by the ICTR, however, even though
such a prosecution is possible under the law developed by the ad-hoc
tribunals, and despite the evidence gathered by a United Nations
investigatory body. Why has no such case come forward to date? To
answer this question, we must examine the mandates and limitations
of international criminal tribunals and the ICC. I will next discuss
below how international criminal law might deal with an arms broker,
and why to this point, it has stopped short of bringing one before a
tribunal.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 16.
32. S/1997/1010 supra note 27 at 8.
33. Id.
34. See Austin, supra note 1. See also MISOL, supra note 3.
35. Austin, supra note 1, at 212.
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III. Direct Prosecution of Black Market Arms Brokers under
International Criminal Law
a. International Criminal Law Generally
International criminal law is "a body of international rules
designed both to proscribe international crimes and to impose upon
States the obligation to prosecute and punish at least some of those
crimes. '36 Substantive international criminal law refers to the rules
governing which acts are considered international crimes, their
elements, defenses, and conditions under which states may or must
prosecute these crimes. 7 Procedural international criminal law refers
to the rules regulating proceedings in international courts and
tribunals.3" International criminal law encompasses a set of crimes
which are broader than those covered by international humanitarian
law, the term that applies to the law of armed conflict. International
criminal law may prosecute violations of international humanitarian
law, as well as crimes that do not take place in the context of an
armed conflict, for example, the category of crimes against humanity.
International criminal law has jurisdiction over limited types of
crimes. For this paper, I will restrict the discussion to international
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, as set out in the Rome
Statute: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.39 (These
crimes will be referred to throughout as the "core crimes"). Briefly,
genocide is defined as killing or other acts with the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.' °
Crimes against humanity are defined as killing or other acts when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack."1 War
crimes are defined as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, or other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within the established framework of
36. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 15 (2003).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The Rome Statute also contains the crime of aggression, which has not been
defined in the Statute but generally refers to the idea of crimes against peace, or
aggressive war. See CASSESE, supra note 36, at 111-116.
40. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 6, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter Rome Statute).
41. Id. art. 7.
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international law.42
Black market arms brokering is a crime which takes place on an
international scale, as illustrated in Part II. It is crucial to note,
however, that illicit arms trade per se is not an international crime
according to either customary international law or international
criminal law.43 Trade violations and smuggling, even in contravention
of a United Nations embargo, remain subject to domestic criminal
law. When discussing the prosecution of arms brokers before
international criminal tribunals or the ICC, the crime in question
must be one of the core crimes, to which the arms broker is an
accomplice or complicit to by virtue of supply."
It should also be noted however, that in most cases in order to be
implicated in one of the core crimes, the arms broker would also
commit a violation of domestic law, be it a violation of a trade law,
treaty, or embargo. The double violation is significant as it highlights
the potential auxiliary role of international criminal institutions as
investigatory bodies, to be discussed further in Part IV. In cases
where the subject matter of international criminal law is implicated
but international courts do not take jurisdiction, domestic prosecution
for these other crimes may still achieve a deterrent effect.
b. Background on the International Criminal Court and the United
Nations Tribunals
The prosecution of an arms broker before an international court
or tribunal would be unprecedented. International criminal law is
relatively new. The codification of a body of international
humanitarian law, and the creation of international courts that may
impose criminal sanctions on individuals who violate international
humanitarian law, has its roots in the Geneva Conventions, and in the
war crimes tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo.4 '5  The ICTY,
convened in 1993, was the first court to enforce the existing body of
42. Id. art. 8.
43. CASSESE, supra note 36, at 24.
44. Liability has been extended to suppliers before, notably in the case of Bruno
Tesch (also known as the "Zyklon B Case"), in which Tesch was found guilty of
knowingly providing poison gas to concentration camps. U.N. WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, in LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS, VOL.1, 93 (1947).
45. Mark Lattimer & Phillipe Sands, Introduction, in JUSTICE FOR CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY (Mark Lattimer & Phillipe Sands QC eds. 2003).
[Vol 29:3
International Criminal Law
international humanitarian law.46 The ICTR, convened in 1994, was
created under a substantially similar statute to that of the ICTY in
response to the internal conflict in Rwanda.
The ICTY and ICTR were convened by the United Nations
Security Council as enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter, to prosecute serious violations of
international humanitarian law.47  They are temporary, ad-hoc
tribunals, intended to address crimes arising from specific conflicts, in
specific locations, and during specific time periods. By prosecuting
the persons responsible, both the ICTY and ICTR are intended to
contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the
restoration and maintenance of peace, as well to ensure that such
violations would be halted and effectively redressed.
In theory, the prosecution of an arms broker, such as Elhers,
would be within the mandate of the ICTR. Why, then, has there been
no such prosecution? The main reason may be that the ad-hoc
tribunals are temporary, and therefore necessarily limited in scope.
The ICTY and ICTR are working towards a "completion strategy"
set forth by the Security Council, which calls for the conclusion of
investigations by 2004, trials by 2008, and appeals by 2010.48 As part
of the completion strategy, both tribunals have adopted strategies
that focus on the prosecution of those persons bearing the greatest
responsibility for the events, and are working to send other
prosecutions to domestic systems. 9
Another reason may be the unprecedented nature of the ad-hoc
tribunals themselves. The ICTY and ICTR have been subject to
scrutiny and criticism for how they have fulfilled their limited
mandates, even as they focus on the prosecution of the leaders most
obviously connected to the conflicts. Mindful that the success of
these institutions will somewhat be determined by the number of
successful trials, it would make sense for the prosecutor not to reach
beyond the actors who are primarily connected to the conflict to
prosecute actors whose connections may seem tenuous or remote.
Such prosecutions would have been undoubtedly controversial, and
46. Id.
47. See S.C. Res. 808, S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the ICTY); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Aug. 11, 1994) (establishing the ICTR).
48. S.C. Res 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003).
49. S.C. Res 1534, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 16, 2004).
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may even have been seen as political. As such, the prosecution of an
arms broker before an ad-hoc tribunal may have been seen as
jeopardizing the "regular" purposes and functions of the court as set
forth in their statutes.
While the ICTY and ICTR, in their limited remaining time, will
not be indicting arms brokers for violations that fall within their
jurisdiction, general principles of international criminal law as
developed at the ad-hoc tribunals will be applicable at the ICC.
Therefore we look to the statutes and decisions of the tribunals to see
how the law is developing around individual criminal responsibility
for atrocities, bearing in mind significant differences in the structure
and functions of the institutions.
c. The International Criminal Court
The ICC is a treaty-based court, established by the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) in 1998. The
Rome Statute is influenced by the same principles of international
law represented in the ICTY and ICTR statutes, as well as by the
statutes and jurisprudence of the tribunals. As a treaty, however, the
Rome Statute reflects the necessity of reaching consensus among the
states and parties represented at the Rome Conference. As such, it is
a document that reflects political concerns, political will, and the
lobbying of non-governmental organizations and advocacy groups.
The ICC has a different relationship with sovereign states than
the ad-hoc tribunals: it is completely dependent on state cooperation
for most of its functions unless the United Nations Security Council
provides additional backing. The ICC was designed to be used as a
measure of last resort, which has two implications for possible
prosecutions of black market arms brokers. First, the ICC's
relationship to domestic legal systems is one of complementarity
rather than primacy, limiting the role of the Court according to the
actions and capabilities of domestic legal systems. Second, the
Court's reliance on state cooperation may affect the ICC's ability to
investigate and prosecute politically sensitive areas.
The subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC is set out in Article V
of the Statute: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
aggression. ° With the exception of the crime of aggression, which has
yet to be defined, the ICC shares many aspects of subject matter
50. Rome Statute, supra note 40, at art. 5.
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jurisdiction with the United Nations tribunals discussed above. As
with the ICTY and ICTR, we may anticipate that arms brokers will
be found to have been instrumental to the commission of the core
crimes listed in the Rome Statute. Whether the ICC can prosecute
them depends on the broker's nationality, on which states are party to
the Statute, and on when and where the alleged acts took place.
The ICC is not an organ of the United Nations. While its
jurisdiction is not geographically restricted, its temporal jurisdiction is
limited to crimes after entry into force of the Statute, and after the
states involved ratified the statute or acceded jurisdiction to the
court." In order for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction, the crime must
either be committed on the territory of a state party to the Statute, or
the accused must be a national of a state party. 2 The Rome Statute
also allows non-state parties to accede jurisdiction to the ICC with
respect to a specific situation,53 and allows the Security Council, under
its Chapter VII powers, to refer a criminal case that fits within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC. 4
The jurisdiction of the ICC is additionally restricted by the
principle of complementarity. The Rome Statute, which requires that
the ICC notify state parties and other implicated states and allow
them to investigate and or prosecute before it may take a case, is
designed to encourage prosecutions by domestic legal systems.5 The
ICC may only proceed if the states involved are unwilling or unable
to genuinely prosecute, under the specific criteria set forth in the
Statute 6 The criteria for unwillingness are set out in Article 17.2,
and require scrutiny of the actions or failure to act of that state with
respect to the matter before the ICC.57 According to the Statute, a
51. Id. at art. 11.
52. Id. at art. 12(2).
53. Id. at art. 12(3).
54. Id. at art. 13(b). See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31,
2005) (referring the situation in Sudan to the ICC).
55. Id. at art. 18.
56. Id. at art. 17.
57. Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute states:
In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall
consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by
international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision
was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in
article 5; (b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in
the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
2006]
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finding of inability requires "total or substantial collapse or
unavailability of its national judicial system.
'58
It remains to be seen how Article 17 will be interpreted by the
Court, especially in terms of the criteria for unwillingness, as the
provisions of Article 17 do leave room for the ICC to act even if a
state is acting on the same matter. In the next section I will go
through the provisions of the Rome Statute that may be applied to an
arms broker, and the case law of the ICTY and ICTR that is
illustrative of the legal issues involved. The following legal theories
are explored notwithstanding the jurisdictional barrier
complementarity and other policy concerns may present, an issue
which will be further explored below in Part IV.
d. Substantive Law of United Nations International Criminal
Tribunals and the ICC
i. Individual criminal responsibility
As middlemen, arms brokers would be charged with a form of
indirect responsibility for genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity. Under international criminal law, an individual may be
held liable for acts committed by others if he knew of the crime (mens
rea) and participated to a certain degree in the crime (actus reus).59
The actual perpetrator incurs a principal or direct responsibility,
while the participator incurs a derivative or indirect responsibility. 6
While the perpetrator is often termed the 'principal' and the
participator the 'secondary party,' the principle of individual
autonomy, which underlies modern criminal law, means that a
secondary party may be no less culpable than the principal.6' This is
codified in Article 25 of the Rome Statute, which provides for
individual responsibility for commission of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC.62 In this discussion I will focus on Article
concerned to justice; (c) The proceedings were not or are not being
conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
58. Id. at art. 17(3).
59. E. VAN SLIEDREGT, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS FOR
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 29 (2003).
60. Id. at 57.
61. Id. at 57-58.
62. Rome Statute, supra note 40, at art. 25.
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25(3)(c) which covers aiding and abetting, and Article 25(3)(d), which
covers acting with a common purpose. Both the statutes of the ICTY
and ICTR contain similar provisions, whereby an individual may
incur individual responsibility for acts where he was not physically
present if his contribution to those acts is direct and substantial.63
In seeking to prove responsibility, the mental element is pivotal -
without proof of the requisite mens rea (knowledge and intent), an
arms broker may not be held accountable for the core crimes. Article
30 of Rome Statute addresses this mental element. Article 30 defines
intent in relation to conduct as meaning to engage in the conduct, and
in relation to a consequence, "that person means to cause that
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of
events."' Article 30 defines knowledge as an "awareness that a
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course
of events., 65 The jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR are instructive
as to how mens rea may be interpreted.
ii. Aiding and Abetting
A charge of aiding or abetting allows an individual to be held
criminally liable for his part in criminal acts committed by others.
The ICTR defined aiding as "giving assistance to someone" and
abetting as "facilitating the commission of a crime by being
sympathetic thereto." 66 The requirements for aiding and abetting
have been summarized by the ICTY Trial Chamber:
(i) It must be demonstrated that the aider and abettor carried out
an act which consisted of practical assistance, encouragement or
moral support to the principal offender.
(ii) The act of assistance need not have actually caused the act of
63. ICTY Statute art. 7(1) states: "A person who planned, instigated, ordered,
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution
of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually
responsible for the crime." ICTR Statute Article 6(1) states: "A person who
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime." International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Amended Statute of the International Tribunal,
art. 7(1) (May 19, 2003), available at <www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm>.
64. Rome Statute, supra note 40, at art. 30(2).
65. Id. at art. 30(3).
66. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T Trial Chamber Judgment,
484 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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the principal offender, but it must have had a substantial effect on
the commission of the crime by the principal offender. The act of
assistance may be either an act or omission, and it may occur
before, during or after the act of the principal offender.
(iii) Presence alone at the scene of the crime is not conclusive of
aiding and abetting unless it is demonstrated to have a significant
legitimising or encouraging effect on the principal offender.
(iv) The mens rea of aiding and abetting requires that the aider and
abettor knew (in the sense that he was aware) that his own acts
assisted in the commission of the specific crime in question by the
principal offender.
(v) The aider and abettor must be aware of the essential elements
of the crime committed by the principal offender, including the
principal offender's mens rea.
(vi) However, the aider and abettor need not share the mens rea of
the principal offender.67
The ICTY has held that that the individual need not intend to
assist or facilitate. "Knowledge on the part of the aider and abettor
that his acts assist in the commission of the principal perpetrator's
crime suffices for the mens rea requirement of this mode of
participation. '" The ICTY has further held that an aider or abettor
need not know the precise crime intended or committed. "If he is
aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed,
and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to
facilitate the commission of that crime, and is guilty as an aider and
abettor. ,
69
Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute addresses aiding and
abetting. An individual "shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that
person, for the purposes of facilitating the commission of such a
crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission, including
providing the means for its commission."70 [emphasis added] This
67. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
88-90 (Mar. 15, 2002) (footnotes omitted).
68. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Appeals Chamber Judgment, T 49
(July 29, 2004).
69. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber Judgment,
246 (Dec. 10, 1998).
70. Rome Statute, supra note 40, at art. 25(3)(c).
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language seems to provide for liability even if the act falls short of the
substantial assistance required by the ICTY for aiding or abetting,
and even if the crime was not completed. It has also been noted,
however, that the Rome Statute, in requiring aiding and abetting "for
the purpose of facilitating" has a higher mens rea standard than that
established in the ad-hoc tribunals.7'
Establishing mens rea for arms brokers in these cases would
require careful accumulation of evidence on the part of prosecutors.
It has been argued that arms brokers should be considered
professionals, and that this status may be used towards establishing
mens rea. A professional arms broker may be subject to the
expectation that they make themselves aware of any possibility that
their transaction may violate an international embargo. 72  This is
especially true where an ongoing humanitarian crisis is the subject of
intense international media attention. Using the Ehlers example, a
court applying international criminal law may find that knowledge of
the embargo and the media attention on the Rwandan genocide may
provide sufficient evidence to presume that he knew or should have
known of the conflict and the crimes being committed.
The prosecutor would likely also want to prove that the broker
knew, with specificity or certainty, the identity of the purchaser.
Given the numerous roles an arms broker may play, such face-to-face
deals, which would clearly provide the best evidence of an arms
broker's knowledge of the identity of the purchaser, may be the
exception rather than the rule. In the context of large international
shipments, however, lack of such evidence may still be overcome. As
William Schabas points out, "Most gun merchants will argue that they
know little of the end use of the firearms they sell .... However, with
regard to violations of international humanitarian law, establishing
knowledge of the end use should generally be less difficult because of
71. VAN SLIEDREGT, supra note 59, at 93.
72. Austin, supra note 1, at 212. With regard to the Ehlers, Austin notes:
Being an expert professional in arms transactions and having previously
come under scrutiny for possible unlawful activities, he had knowledge of
legal arms brokering requirements and understood the need to familiarize
himself with all the details of the transactions in order not to be involved in a
foul deal - especially a violation of an international arms embargo. Both the
international arms embargo and the Rwandan genocide were widely
reported in the South African and international press. Moreover, it can be
illustrated that Ehlers knew his clients - already accused of the gravest of
crimes - and their motives, yet assisted them with the purposeful attempt to
cover up an illicit operation that was meant to help conclude the genocide.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the scale and nature of the assistance., 73
As Schabas points out, the fact that the act in question is
facilitating the sale of a large shipment of arms to a country or group
under embargo may be useful for proving mens rea. Such evidence
may also be useful for overcoming defenses of ignorance and
legitimate use. Once an embargo has been imposed, notice is given of
an extraordinary situation in that region. While, under ordinary
circumstances, arms may be legitimately sold for military and civilian
use, the imposition of an embargo de-legitimizes all further sales of
arms. A court may find, once the broker's knowledge of the embargo
and buyer has been established, that the broker also knew or should
have known that there were no legal purposes for that particular sale
for the express reason that crimes were being committed or were
likely to be committed in that region.
The issue of an alleged accomplice's knowledge of legitimate
versus illegitimate uses for goods was raised in war crimes tribunals
after the Second World War. There, poison gas manufacturers
avoided conviction by successfully claiming ignorance of the end use
of their product, while suppliers of the same substance were found
guilty of complicity in genocide. These issues have been raised more
recently with the December 2005 conviction by a Dutch court of
Frans van Anraat, a Dutch businessman, for complicity in war crimes
in connection with his sales of chemicals to Saddam Hussein. The
court found that van Anraat had known that the materials he sold to
Iraq during the rule of Saddam Hussein could be used to make lethal
poison gas.75
The court acquitted van Anraat for complicity in genocide,
however, finding that it could not be proved that he knew that the
chemicals would be used for genocide.76 When the underlying crime
of the principal is genocide, aiding or abetting is more difficult to
prove, due to the specific intent requirement. The jurisprudence of
73. William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the
accomplices, in INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROss 450 (June 2001).
74. In the "Zyklon B Case" the supplier of the poison gas Zyklon B, used for
mass extermination at concentration camps, was convicted, while in the "I.G. Farben
Case," the manufacturers successfully argued that they were unaware of the end use
of the product, and that they thought it was being used as a delousing agent. See
Schabas, supra note 73, at 443.
75. Marlise Simons, Vendor Tied To Gas Attack Is Convicted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 2005, at A5.
76. Id.
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the ICTR is unclear as to whether aiding and abetting genocide
requires a shared specific intent, or knowledge of the principal's
genocidal intent." If proof of shared intent is required, arms brokers
might be excluded, as they are more likely to be motivated by profit
than by genocidal intent. Depending on the identity of the buyer and
the facts of the case, it may be possible to prove that an arms broker
had knowledge of the perpetrator's genocidal intent. It is worth
noting that the ICTR has specifically referred to "complicity by
procuring means, such as weapons, instruments, or any other means,
used to commit genocide, with the accomplice knowing that such
means would be used for such a purpose.... "" However, a
prosecutor may still face problems in proving how far the broker's
knowledge may be presumed to reach, and the threshold for proving
genocidal intent with respect to the principal remains high.
iii. Common Purpose and Joint Criminal Enterprise
Another theory of criminal liability which may be applicable to
arms brokers is that of common purpose or joint criminal enterprise
(JCE), which generally involves a greater degree of individual
criminal responsibility than aiding and abetting.79 JCE has been
found to be implicitly included in Article 7(1) of the Statute of the
ICTY.8° Three categories of JCE have been defined. JCE 1 requires
a common purpose with the same criminal intent, and includes cases
of "co-perpetratorship." 8' JCE 2 requires action pursuant to a
concerted plan, and "is characterized by the existence of an organized
criminal system, in particular in the case of concentration or
detention camps." ' It seems unlikely that an arms broker would be
sufficiently involved with the planning or commission of crimes to fit
these modes of liability.
77. Larissa van den Herik & Elies van Sliedregt, Ten Years Later, the Rwanda
Tribunal Still Faces Complexities: Some Comments on the Vagueness of the
Indictment, Complicity in Genocide, and the Nexus Requirement for War Crimes, 17
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 537, 548 (2004). I am indebted to Susan L. Park for additional
insight into this issue.
78. Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 66, at 9 533-37.
79. Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, 92 (Feb 28, 2005). For an outline of the distinctions between aiding and
abetting and JCE in the law of the ad-hoc tribunals, see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, $ 229 (July 15, 1999).
80. Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 79, at 1 220.
81. Id. at 9 198.
82. Kvocka Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 79, at $[ 82.
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JCE 3 "concerns cases involving a common design to pursue one
course of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits an act
which, while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural
and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common
purpose.,83 In such cases, "[c]riminal responsibility may be imputed
to all participants within the common enterprise where the risk of
death occurring was both a predictable consequence of the execution
of the common design and the accused was either reckless or
indifferent to that risk." It should be noted at the outset that
commentators have read Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, which
provides for liability under a common purpose doctrine, to exclude
JCE 3.85 After laying out the basic principles of JCE according to the
ad-hoc tribunals, I will discuss this argument and its applicability to
arms brokers.
The elements of JCE require a plurality of persons, the existence
of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or involves
the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute, and the
participation of the accused in the common design.' This requires the
establishment of the existence of an arrangement or understanding
that a particular crime will be committed, but this arrangement or
understanding need not be express, and it may be inferred from all
the circumstances. 87 While the contribution need not be substantial,
the significance of the contribution will be relevant to demonstrating
shared intent.' The accused's participation also need not be "a sine
qua non, without which the crimes could or would not have been
committed., 89 In addition, an individual may be held responsible for
83. Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 79, at 204.
84. Id.
85. See E. VAN SLIEDREGT, supra note 59, at 107-109. Article 25 (3)(d) of the
ICC Statute provides that a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person,
in any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such
contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of
furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such
activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group
to commit the crime.
86. Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 79, at 227.
87. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No, IT-98-32-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
100 (Feb. 25, 2004).
88. Kvocka Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 79, at 97.
89. Id. at $ 98.
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crimes outside the common purpose if it was foreseeable that such a
crime might be perpetrated, and the accused willingly took that risk.'
For JCE 3, the mens rea requires "the intention to participate in
and further the criminal activity or the criminal purpose of a group
and to contribute to the joint criminal enterprise or in any event to
the commission of a crime by the group."91  In this case,
"responsibility for a crime other than the one agreed upon in the
common plan arises only if, under the circumstances of the case, (i) it
was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or
other members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that
risk." '  A court may find that a broker, taking extraordinary
measures to circumvent an embargo, exhibits behavior reckless or
indifferent to the risk that he is participating in crimes. Although the
preliminary obstacles of proving knowledge and intent remain,
combined with the need to establish a common purpose, the acts of a
black market arms broker may well fit within JCE 3 as outlined in the
jurisprudence of the ad-hoc tribunals.
The common purpose doctrine in the Rome Statute largely
corresponds to JCE. JCE 1 and most types of JCE 2 will fit within
25(3)(d)(i), which requires shared intent.93 JCE 3, however, may "fall
outside the ambit of the ICC regime."94 Article 25(3)(d)(ii) states that
an individual must make an intentional contribution to the
commission or attempted commission of a crime with the knowledge
of the intention of the group to commit the crime.95 [emphasis added]
This does not allow for liability based on the "foreseeability-risk test"
for JCE 3, but imposes a higher standard of mens rea.9'
Following this analysis of the common purpose provisions of the
Rome Statute, and given the specific reference in Article 25(3)(c) to
providing means for the commission of crimes, it seems that an arms
broker before the ICC would be charged with aiding and abetting,
rather than acting with a common purpose. The theoretical
possibility of prosecution before the ICC, however, must still contend
with factors external to the substantive law of the Rome Statute.
90. Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 79, at 228.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. VAN SLIEDREGT, supra note 59, at 108.
94. Id. at 109.
95. Rome Statute, supra note 40, at art. 25(3)(d).
96. VAN SLIEDREGT, supra note 59, at 108.
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Whether such prosecutions take place may depend on applicable
international agreements, internal policies of the ICC, and the
relationship of the ICC to domestic courts. While certain of these
factors may diminish the likelihood of direct international
prosecution of arms brokers, they may yet work indirectly to combat
the impunity of arms brokers.
IV. Indirect uses of International Criminal Law: Developing
Principles, Applying Pressure, and Domestic Prosecutions
a. International Agreements: Developing Principles, Creating
State Obligations
The discussion of direct prosecution of arms brokers under
international criminal law centers on rules. Given that the legal, gray,
and black markets coexist and overlap, the development of clear
standards is necessary to combat the impunity of black market arms
brokers. The past ten years has seen a remarkable increase in
international efforts to regulate arms brokers. There are two major
international instruments, the 2001 United Nations Programme of
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and the 2001
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (United Nations Firearms Protocol). 7 In addition,
there are ongoing efforts to develop an international arms trade
treaty, both within the United Nations and in the NGO community.98
With respect to arms brokers, the PoA is the more relevant
97. U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All
Its Aspects, Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade
in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, U.N., Doc. A/CONF.192/15 at
1.5 (July 20, 2001); G.A. Res. 55/255, U.N. Doc. Protocol against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and
Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, available at
<www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime-cicp-convention.html>. The United Nations
Firearms Protocol entered into force in July of 2005. Although it is a legally binding
instrument, it is criticized for using non-constraining language with respect to the
specific measures states should adopt at the national level. See ANDERS &
CATTENEO, supra note 19, at 22.




document. The PoA is a non-legally binding document which
explicitly recognizes that the illicit arms trade "sustains conflicts,
exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians,
undermines respect for international humanitarian law, impedes the
provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of armed conflict and
fuels crime and terrorism."" It calls upon states
to put in place, where they do not exist, adequate laws, regulations
and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the
production of small arms and light weapons within their areas of
jurisdiction and over the export, import, transit or retransfer of
such weapons, in order to prevent illegal manufacture of and illicit
trafficking in small arms and light weapons, or their diversion to
unauthorized recipients.' °°
It expressly calls on states to establish as criminal offences the
illegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade of small arms
and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction. 1 Notably, the
PoA further calls on states "to take appropriate measures, including
all legal or administrative means," against any activity that violates a
United Nations Security Council Embargo. 2
The United Nations convenes periodic reviews of the PoA and
the progress made by states in implementing its recommendations. A
recent report on states' progress on the PoA noted that "less than 40
states have laws enabling them to control arms brokering activities. '"103
Even if this number increases, an international agreement is called for
to create harmonization between state laws, which can differ greatly.
Differences between state laws create "loop-holes and inconsistencies
that dubious arms brokers will be able to continue to exploit."
1 4
In the summer of 2006, the United Nations will convene a major
review conference of the PoA in New York. The review conference
is expected to address the implementation of the PoA by reviewing
the progress made and by considering further measures to strengthen
99. Programme of Action, supra note 97, at 1.5.
100. Id. at 11.2.
101. Id. at 11.3.
102. Id. at 11.4.
103. CHARLOTIrE WATSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ACTION NETWORK ON SMALL
ARMS, INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON SMALL ARMS 2005: EXAMINING
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PROGRAMME OF ACTION: BITING THE BULLET 2005 6
(2005), available at <www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/11214556431red-book-2005.pdf>.
104. Id.
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and promote effective implementation.' 5  It is also expected to
address the lack of international action to combat the illegal arms
trade.' ° A United Nations Open Ended Working Group has recently
concluded negotiations towards an international instrument to enable
states to identify and trace illicit arms recovered in the context of
armed conflict and crime." However, the limited focus on marking
and tracing of small arms is evidence of the contentiousness of this
particular area of state activity. While it is generally acknowledged
by NGOs, and in the substance of the PoA, that broader controls are
necessary, the much more limited United Nations Firearms protocol
and the recommendations of the working groups reflect the political
realities.
The PoA is seen as compromised in substance in order to achieve
consensus, and crime prevention is seen as a particular area of
weakness." s A legally binding international instrument to regulate
arms brokers, however, would create definite obligations on states,
particularly in the area of domestic prosecution of arms brokers. In
the past, state objections to the negotiation of a legally binding
instrument have forced the compromise of establishing a United
Nations Group of Experts with a limited mandate.1°9 With the
expectation that similar objections may be encountered this time
around, groups are pushing for the establishment, after 2006, of
another Open Ended Working Group to negotiate a treaty to control
small arms brokering activities.11
However, state objections raised at a recent United Nations
preparatory conference shows that the arms trade remains an area
where certain states are particularly reluctant to enter into a legally
105. OWEN GREENE, PROMOTING EFFECTIVE GLOBAL ACTION ON SMALL ARMS:
EMERGING AGENDAS FOR THE 2006 UN REVIEW CONFERENCE, BITING THE BULLET
DISCUSSION PAPER 1 (2005), available at <www.saferworld.org.uk/iac/
BtB %20Emerging%20issues.pdf>.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 29. See draft instrument and report of the U.N. OPEN-ENDED
WORKING GROUP ON TRACING ILLICIT SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, Draft
International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and
Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons Annex, U.N. Doc. A/60/88
(June 25, 2005). See also GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON TRACING ILLICIT
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts
on Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, U.N. Doc. A/58/138 (July 11,
2003).
108. GREENE, supra note 105, at 29.
109. Id. at 7.
110. Id. at 7. See G.A. Res. 59/86, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/86 (Dec. 3, 2004).
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binding agreement." Measures which would constrain the legal trade
and legal manufacture of weapons, impose domestic restrictions on
civilian ownership and use of weapons, or ban transfers to non-state
actors, were objected to as falling outside the scope of the PoA.12 In
addition, for political, strategic, and economic reasons, certain states
may choose to obstruct the process indefinitely, basing their
objections in broadly stated policy concerns such as sovereignty,
national security, and terrorism.
It is true that the issue of a binding international arms trade
treaty, like any binding international instrument, implicates issues of
sovereignty. An arms trade treaty would clarify domestic obligations
regarding regulation of the arms trade, including the criminal
prosecution of illegal arms brokering. The negotiation process would
raise the domestic profile of issues surrounding the arms trade,
forcing states to examine their domestic regimes. An international
instrument would be expected to ask states to establish national
controls, clarify the goods to be covered, contain model regulations
and definitions to ensure consistent national controls, establish
arrangements for information exchange and consultation, and
establish minimum penalties as well as mechanisms for cooperation in
enforcement.
113
As advocates for an arms trade treaty point out, however,
unregulated arms brokers exact an enormous human cost, and such
domestic measures must be seen as a necessary solution.' An
111. Press Release, IANSA, Axis of Inaction: Coalition of the Unwilling Blocks
Progress on Controlling Small Arms (Jan. 20, 2006), available at
<www.iansa.org/un/review2006/End-of-conference-press-statement-IANSA.pdf>
(identifying in particular the United States, Iran, Israel, Egypt, China, Syria, India,
and Pakistan). Statements of the participants are available at <www.un.org/events/
smallarms2006/statements-prep.html>.
112. See Steven Costner, U.S. Dept. of State, United States Opening Statement to
the Preparatory Committee Meeting for the First Review Conference of the United
Nations Program of Action for Small Arms and Light Weapons (Jan. 11, 2006),
available at <www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdflUnited%20States.pdf >. The
objection to a ban on transfers to non-state actors could prove particularly
problematic for preventing crimes committed in the context of internal armed
conflict, where at least one party is typically a non-state actor.
113. GREENE, supra note 105, at 7.
114. For an examination of the overall human cost of small arms, see T. Jackson,
N. Marsh, T. Owen and A. Thurin, Who Takes the Bullet? The impact of small arms
violence, Understanding the issues no. 3/2005, available at <www.prio.no/files/
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international arms trade treaty, signed and ratified by a significant
number of states, would transform the relationship between
international criminal law and the illegal arms trade by creating
multiple points for accountability and therefore deterrents. An illicit
arms broker performs any number of potentially illegal acts - from
the breaking of an international embargo, to the breaking of the
domestic trade law of any number of states, to complicity in the core
crimes of international criminal law. The existence of an
international treaty would greatly increase the possibility that there
would be laws on the books of the states in which the broker operated
that could be used to prosecute him domestically for crimes other
than genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Although
such domestic prosecutions would likely carry lesser penalties than
domestic or international prosecution for the core crimes, they would
nonetheless be an improvement over the impunity that arms brokers
currently enjoy.
In this scenario, increases in national legislation which
encouraged prosecution for arms trafficking crimes would still be
aided by international criminal law. Here, the ICC may play an
auxiliary role, through providing information and exposing
transactions, to ensure that some action is taken by the state to
enforce their treaty obligations with regard to prosecuting arms
trafficking crimes. The importance of encouraging domestic
legislation is underlined by the internal policies of the ICC. While the
law of the Rome Statute provides for the prosecution of complicit
crimes such as supply and funding, the prosecutor of the ICC has
forecasted a limited role of mutual support with respect to functional
domestic institutions. This policy makes an international arms trade
treaty all the more important.
b. Applying Pressure: The ICC and Complementarity
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, in a Policy Paper
given in September of 2003, stated that, "as a general rule, the Office
of the Prosecutor should focus its investigative and prosecutorial
efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest responsibility,
such as the leaders of the State or organisation allegedly responsible
for those crimes. 115 This policy has been followed in the first group
115. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE




of indictments issued by the ICC in July 2005, and unsealed in
October 2005, against the leadership of the Lord's Resistance Army
in Uganda.'16 Despite stating a narrow scope for its indictments, the
OTP has also recognized the centrality of arms brokers and financers
to the crimes within its jurisdiction. In the same policy paper, the
OTP states that financial links with crimes will be an important area
of investigation for the ICC, noting that "[t]he investigation of
financial transactions, for example for the purchase of arms used in
murder, may well provide evidence proving the commission of
atrocities."
However, for criminal actors who fall below the threshold of
senior leadership of the state and organization involved, the OTP will
call on national authorities to assist with investigations and to provide
information regarding financial transactions within their
jurisdictions. 7 Furthermore, the OTP may be able to provide
evidence to national authorities which may be used in domestic
prosecutions, curbing the source of funding and deterring future
crimes."' This is part of a "two-tiered approach" to combat impunity:
initiating prosecutions of those who bear the most responsibility for
the crimes while encouraging national prosecutions for lower-ranking
perpetrators, or working with the international community "to ensure
that the offenders are brought to justice by some other means."11 9 In
this way the ICC will put pressure on domestic systems to address
crimes committed by arms brokers.
The principle of complementarity is also designed to encourage
domestic prosecutions. If, for example, the ICC were to open an
investigation in Rwanda, and find that Rwanda was unwilling or
unable to prosecute, it may take jurisdiction over the state and
military actors in the conflict. If, in the course of investigations, the
OTP uncovered evidence of arms transfers by Ehlers, a South African
national, it may gather information as it pertained to other
prosecutions, but would be bound by the terms set out in the Rome
Statute to notify state parties which may have jurisdiction over the
116. Press Release, International Criminal Court, Warrant of Arrest unsealed
against five LRA Commanders (Oct. 14, 2005), available at <www.icc-
cpi.int/press/pressreleases/114.html>.
117. PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR,
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crimes concerned before acting with regard to Ehlers.120 Should any
state inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated its
nationals or others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts
"which may constitute crimes referred to in Article 5 [the core
crimes] and which relate to the information provided in the
notification to States," it may request that the ICC defer
investigation. The ICC must then defer, unless it applies for and
receives authorization from the pre-trial chamber.
21
With respect to prosecuting arms brokers, it is important to note
that under Article 18, the State's investigation must also be with
respect to the core crimes."' Should the State be investigating an
arms broker for any other criminal acts associated with the
transaction and not for a core crime, presumably the ICC would not
be barred from investigation for a core crime. This again raises the
issue of the relative gravity of the crimes that an arms broker
commits. Being prosecuted in a domestic court for an embargo
violation will carry lighter penalties and less stigma than being
prosecuted for war crimes or crimes against humanity in a domestic
or international court. If a major goal of such prosecutions is
deterrence, one might argue that it would be equally accomplished by
either charge. However, the prosecution of an arms broker for
embargo violations, when they have supplied the means for
commission of core crimes, could be construed as having a negative
effect in that such prosecutions fail to hold them accountable for the
121full extent of their crimes.
120. Rome Statute, supra note 40, at art. 18. Note that the broad geographic reach
of an illegal arms deal would raise interesting questions regarding territoriality for
the ICC. It is to be expected that multiple states would be implicated, and factors to
be considered may include the nationality of the broker, place of registration of any
transport, states that provided documentation or transfer points, and states whose
financial institutions are involved in financing a deal.
121. Id.
122. Id. at art. 20. Article 20 of the Rome Statute bars the Court from trying
someone who has been tried by another court "for conduct also proscribed under
article 6, 7 or 8" with respect to the same conduct." There are exceptions if the
proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (b)
Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance
with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
123. On the significance of sentencing suppliers, see, e.g., comments of Presiding
Judge Roel van Rossum in the case of chemical weapons supplier Frans van Anraat:
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c. Domestic Prosecution: Bringing International Criminal Law
Home
As the establishment and first steps of the ICC are raising the
overall profile of international criminal law, greater attention is also
being given to the possibilities of prosecuting the core crimes within
domestic courts. This attention, many argue, is long overdue. As
Timothy McCormack writes, "Despite the rhetoric of a commitment
to the principle of trying war crimes, the practice of states confirms
glaring inconsistencies between those acts which are tried and those
which are not - inconsistencies most readily explicable on the basis of
an 'us' and 'them' mentality.', 2 4 In a survey of domestic trials of
states' own nationals for serious violations of international criminal
law, McCormack identifies three categories - domestic trials by states
in political transition, domestic trials influenced by international
criminal tribunals, and domestic trials for serious breaches of military
discipline.
It is this second area which may inform the issue of prosecuting
arms brokers, in particular, the idea that a threat of international
prosecution may act as a catalyst to overcome otherwise weak
political will to prosecute. In most of the cases that have been
prosecuted to date, however, the trials deal with military actors and
are cases where the state has acted to prevent trials at the hands of
victors or by other ethnic groups. Such prosecutions have been
intermittent and do not yet constitute an established practice of
domestic prosecutions for the core crimes, although as awareness of
international criminal law grows, such cases may be expected to
increase.
McCormack notes that "trials of those fellow nationals who are
representative of the predominant 'us' will always be more difficult to
prosecute." '25 He identifies "an aversion to accept the ugliness of
what their own troops have done against the enemy they have come
"His deliveries facilitated the attacks and constitute a very serious war crime. He
cannot counter with the argument that this would have happened even without his
contribution. Even the maximum sentence is not enough to cover the seriousness of
the acts." Anne Penketh & Robert Verkaik, Dutch Court Says Gassing of Kurds Was
'Genocide,' THE INDEPENDENT (UK), Dec. 24, 2005.
124. Timothy L H McCormack, Their Atrocities and Our Misdemeanors: The
Reticence of States to Try their 'Own Nationals' for International Crimes, in JUSTICE
FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 107 (Mark Lattimer & Phillipe Sands QC eds.
2003) at 108.
125. Id. at 141.
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to dehumanize.' ' 126 I would suggest that there is a similarly ingrained
reluctance, albeit a much subtler one, to prosecute businessmen. As
William Schabas notes, such accomplices commit white-collar crime
"in its most barbaric and cynical guise, stimulated and encouraged by
international bankers, investors, transnationals, airlines and traders
who are, in the most charitable of scenarios, willfully blind to their
participation in human rights violations.'
127
Arms brokers are motivated by profit, exploiting strategic
advantages, and providing a product for which there is a great market
demand. They operate according to the same values that created the
vast wealth of western economies. It can almost certainly be said that
states would prefer to look elsewhere for their war criminals. The
investigation of these individuals by NGOs and international
organizations has been invaluable in exposing the willful blindness of
states to the crimes of their own nationals. The vulnerability of
corporate actors and other non-state and non-military actors is
already perceived as a consequence of a permanent international
criminal court.'28 This exposure, combined with the pressure of active
international criminal courts, may finally begin to erode the impunity
of arms brokers.
While impunity for black market arms brokers is the current
reality, there are already signs that it does not have to be the future.
One case, already mentioned, is the conviction of Frans van Anraat
for complicity in war crimes by a Dutch Court. Another case, more
relevant to this discussion but in early stages, is that of arms broker
Guus van Kouwenhoven. In March of 2005, the Dutch government
indicted van Kouwenhoven for war crimes against Liberian citizens,
and for violating the United Nations embargo on Liberia. 129 NGO
reports had exposed Van Kouwenhoven, a fixture in the inner circle
of Charles Taylor and head of a profitable group of natural resource
and arms trade operations in Liberia, for his illegal smuggling of
arms, timber, and mineral resources.130 His prosecution by the Dutch
126. Id. at 142.
127. Schabas, supra note 73, at 451.
128. Id. at 439-59.
129. U.N. Integrated Regional Information Networks, Dutch Police Arrest
National for War Crimes in Liberia, AFRICA NEWS, Mar. 22, 2005.
130. Press Release, Global Witness, European Timber Trader Linked with





government is an excellent example of a reciprocal relationship
between domestic and international criminal courts. The Prosecutor
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), David Crane, stated
that SCSL investigators provided extensive support to Dutch
investigators.' Crane further stated that he did not have evidence
that van Kouwenhoven was among those bearing 'greatest
responsibility' for international crimes in Sierra Leone, and so could
not, or chose not to, indict him.32 This case further illustrates the
hierarchy of indictees made by the prosecutors of international
criminal courts and the ongoing necessity of domestic prosecution.
Having domestic precedents for the prosecution of black market
arms brokers will help end impunity, but domestic systems on their
own have proven unreliable and uneven in their approach.
International law, as detailed in Part III and Part IV, is developing in
ways that can greatly help domestic prosecutions be more consistent
and effective in the future. International agreements could help to
create standardized legal tools for domestic prosecution. Domestic
prosecution can be aided by the jurisprudence of international
criminal courts and tribunals. The prosecution of van Kouwenhoven
shows that international actors can be of direct help in providing
evidence to domestic prosecutions, and that the development of
international criminal law presents the domestic prosecutor with an
increasingly functional set of tools. Whether the political will exists to
use those tools will be addressed below.
V. Conclusion
There are a number of individual arms brokers who have become
infamous for their ability to exploit legal loopholes and collude with
governments in order to ply their wares to militias and in war zones
around the world.133 These brokers have been named, reported on,
and yet continue to operate. At the same time, the United Nations
has repeatedly noted that volatile situations tend to combust with new
deliveries of arms, which is indeed the whole point behind arms
131. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor Welcomes Arrest of
Taylor Associate on Charges of War Crimes, Mar. 22, 2005, available at <www.sc-
sl.org/press-otp.html>.
132. Id.
133. See International Action Network on Small Arms, Arms Brokers, at
<www.iansa.org/issues/armsbrokers.htm> (visited Feb. 26, 2006). See also
Landesman, supra note 11, at 28.
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embargos.
Returning to the situation in Rwanda, in their final report
UNICOI stated that the situation in the Great Lakes region was
"rapidly heading towards a catastrophe of incalculable consequences
which requires urgent, comprehensive and decisive measures on the
part of the international community. The danger of a repetition of
tragedy comparable to the Rwandan genocide of 1994, but on a
subregional scale, cannot be ruled out.'3'  With conflict and
instability ongoing in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda,
Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan, the prediction of the Commission
seems tragically accurate, and decisive international measures sadly
absent.
If ending the impunity of arms brokers comes down to
strengthening political will, whose will should be shored up first? The
Commission concluded that "most African countries, and in
particular the countries in the Great Lakes region, do not have the
expertise, training or resources to monitor the illegal flow of arms,
and some clearly lack the political will to do so. '5 They noted the
lack of treaties or international controls governing the proliferation of
small arms, and that the national laws that do exist are often
circumvented by arms dealers who make use of third countries to
arrange arms shipments."6 They noted, in a number of reports, the
unenforceability of United Nations embargos, and that in this case, as
in many others, the lack of domestic legislation implementing the
embargo left no effective means to enforce the embargo or prosecute
the violators. The Commission itself concluded that an arms embargo
did not constitute an "effective, proactive mechanism."'37
The most effective approach to end the impunity of black market
arms brokers is uniform, universal criminalization of their activities.
If all states incorporate an embargo into their national law, it will
greatly decrease the ability of brokers to circumvent embargos by
operating from third countries. The very existence of a permanent
international criminal court speaks to some consensus among states
that the acts constituting the core crimes are universally proscribed.
And the existence of international criminal sanctions for arms
brokers' contributions to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
134. S/1998/1096 supra note 27 at 17.
135. Id. at 18.
136. Id.
137. S/1996/195 supra note 27 at 14.
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humanity would both acknowledge the centrality of their acts to those
grave crimes, and lift some of the burden of deterrence from a
struggling regulatory regime.
The ICC remains a largely untested institution, and one that will
be closely watched. It is highly likely that the OTP will follow its
stated policy of focusing on those bearing the greatest responsibility,
while at the same time sharing information with and encouraging
national prosecutions. In the future, however, the direct prosecution
of arms dealers for crimes within the statute of the court does remain
a possibility. The ICC has roots in both tried legal theories, as it
follows the work of the ad-hoc tribunals, and in policy aims, as the
first permanent court to address agreed upon international crimes as
not only a means of redress, but also of prevention and deterrence.
As M. Cherif Bassiouni writes:
The purpose of a permanent international criminal court is to
combine humanitarian values and policy considerations which are
essential for justice, redress, and prevention, with the need for
restoration and preservation or peace. An international criminal
court is the most appropriate international mechanism through
which the proscriptive norms against genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes can become effective instrumental
norms, as opposed to being essentially the embodiment of intrinsic
values reflecting international social expectations. The consistent
interpretation and successive application of such norms intensifies
118social expectations and reinforces compliance.
As discussed above, one of the main obstacles to the prevention
of arms traffic into areas of humanitarian crisis is that states lack the
political will, and in many cases also the practical means, to do so.
States may choose not to enforce embargos or to prosecute their
violators in their jurisdictions because these states rely on the same
arms brokers for some of their own military needs.3 9 Arms brokers
operate with relative impunity in part because there is unofficial but
very effective tolerance of their activities. Their contributions to
atrocities are disregarded as a matter of convenience and policy.
Prosecuting arms brokers remains a low priority in domestic criminal
138. M Cherif Bassiouni, The Permanent International Criminal Court, in JUSTICE
FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 175 (Mark Lattimer & Phillipe Sands QC eds.
2003).
139. See Marsh, supra note 5, at 221. See also Farah and Austin, supra note 13.
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law. As of now, there is little incentive to use domestic resources to
prosecute crimes which have little impact in the arms brokers' home
jurisdiction. This is especially true when such prosecutions would
dislodge the barrier between "us" and "them," effectively making a
businessman no better than a concentration camp commander.
It remains to be seen whether the ICC, through direct and
indirect means, will successfully overcome what McCormack has
called "the inconsistencies and selectivities riddling the approaches of
various nations to prosecute international crimes pursuant to their
own domestic law., 140 Direct prosecution of arms brokers in the ICC
would work as a means of deterrence, through the codification and
enforcement of the societal norms against the core crimes. 41 Such
prosecutions would go further to create an "effective instrumental
norm" against the permissive climate in which international arms
brokers currently operate.
The precise details of how the ICC will share responsibility with
domestic prosecution are yet to be determined, as is the exact form of
effective treaty dealing with arms brokers. But the overall shape of
accountability for black market arms brokers is clear. It would
involve complementary enforcement by both the ICC and domestic
prosecution, relying on crimes defined by the Rome Statute, other
treaties, and domestic statutes. Underlying the move towards
accountability is a greater recognition of the gravity of the crimes that
black market arms brokers commit.
The ad-hoc tribunals will close without having prosecuted the
arms brokers complicit in the crimes within their jurisdiction. While
their failure to prosecute the suppliers may be disappointing, we may
also acknowledge that human rights advocacy often calls for ideas
whose time has not yet come as a means, in time, of bringing them to
pass. This paper is written under the assumption that international
criminal law and the ICC are here to stay, will mature and grow in
strength, and may in time expand their focus and reach. To this end,
it is valuable to group arms brokers, who are often from, or who have
strong ties to developed, conflict-free regions, with the genocidaires
and war criminals who keep them in business. To do so undermines
140. McCormack, supra note 124, at 107.
141. It is also worth noting that the Rome Statute may be amended seven years
after entry into force. See Rome Statute arts. 121 and 123. It is conceivable that the
ICC may in time expand its jurisdiction to include other crimes, and that trafficking
crimes could one day be explicitly prosecutable by the court.
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the deflective quality inherent in dissociating the acts of arms brokers
from the subsequent crimes committed with their wares. It
undermines the "otherness" of the conflicts where the illegal arms
brokers have the greatest and most deadly impact. Close
examination of the applications of international criminal law to the
acts of black market arms brokers may eventually overcome states'
own complicity in ignoring these crimes, and encourage legislation
and enforcement of regulations and criminal laws effective enough to
stop them.
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